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A. INTRODUCTION
An escape clause is a provision inserted in a legal instrument to supplement or 
cure the defect in the main rule, especially where the main rule has little or 
no connection with the issue to be resolved before the court.1 Escape clauses 
honour the claim that no legal instrument is perfect and strive to improve the 
instrument by giving the court the discretion to locate the law of  a country 
that is more or most closely connected with the subject-matter.2 This feature in 
an escape clause makes it deserving of  special attention.
The escape clauses in the Rome Convention,3 Rome I Regulation (Rome I)4 
and the Rome II Regulation (Rome II)5 have at least four similar features. First, 
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1 SC Symeonides, “Rome II and Tort Confl icts: A Missed Opportunity” (2008) 56 American Jour-
nal of  Comparative Law 173, 197. 
2 Ibid.
3 On the law applicable to contractual obligations [1980] OJ L266. 
4 Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  17 June 
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations [2008] OJ L177/6. Art 29 Rome I pro-
vides that it shall apply from 17 December 2009. It replaces the Rome Convention.
5 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  11 July 
2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations [2007] OJ L19940. It takes effect 
in courts of  Member States only to events giving rise to damage occurring after 11 January 
2009, as decided by the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (CJEU) in Case C-412/10 
Homawoo v GMF Assurances SA [2012] ILPR 2 [37]. The English courts in Innovia Films Limited v 
Frito-Lay North America Inc [2012] EWHC 790 [100]; VTB Capital Plc v Nutritek International Corp 
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the three instruments generally adopt geographical or jurisdictional selection 
rules in deploying the escape clause as opposed to ‘better law’ or substantive 
justice principles inherent in some US systems.6 Secondly, they usually involve 
the weighing of  contacts to the dispute involved in order to identify the law 
of  the country that appears more or most closely connected to the dispute. 
Thirdly, they place the burden of  proof  on the party who relies on the escape 
clause to displace the main rule.7 Fourthly, they face the tension of  meeting the 
requirements of  legal certainty and the need to do justice in individual cases.
This paper takes a critical look at the operation of  the escape clause in 
the Rome Convention, Rome I and Rome II and different approaches are 
identifi ed and discussed with regard to deploying the escape clause in those 
instruments. In Section B, the writers defend the intermediary approach as 
appropriate to the deployment of  the escape clause under the Rome Conven-
tion. Special attention is also given to the confusion created among English 
courts on the connection between an implied choice of  law and law in the 
absence of  choice as it concerns deploying the escape clause under the Rome 
Convention. This paper proposes the deletion of  the doctrine of  implied choice 
of  law in order to create certainty in deploying the escape clause.
In Section C, it is advocated that the strong presumption approach is the 
appropriate approach in deploying the escape clause in Rome I. The writers 
utilise recent judicial decisions in England as a basis for identifying the differ-
ence between the threshold of  displacement under Rome I and the Rome 
Convention.
In Section D, the writers advocate a functional intermediary approach as 
appropriate in deploying the escape clause in Rome II. The writers utilise 
[2012] EWCA Civ 808 [145]; and Alliance Bank JSC v Aquanta Corp [2012] EWCA [37]–[38] 
recently followed the CJEU’s decision in Homawoo. However, Burton J in Alliance Bank [37]–[38] 
 queries the CJEU’s decision as not clearing the doubt as to whether the date that applies is 
the one when the damage manifests itself  or the event that gives rise to the resulting damage. 
He [reluctantly] prefers the former interpretation on the ground that Art 4(1) and (2) Rome II 
are concerned with the “law of  the country where the damage occurs”, despite the fact that 
the escape clause in Art 4(3) apparently does not restrict itself  to the general rule in Art 4(1) 
and (2). See also earlier English cases on the controversy as to when the Rome II comes into 
operation: Bonsall v Cattolica Assicurazioni [2010] ILPR 45 [8]; Bacon v Nacional Suizaciga [2010] 
EHWC 2017 (QB) [61]; Homawoo v GMF Assurance [2010] EHWC 1941 [43]–[52]; Lucas Film 
Limited v Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39 [91]; Hillside (New Media) Limited v Biarte Baasland [2010] 
EHWC 1941 (QB) [23]–[25].
   
6 Credit Lyonnais v New Hampshire Insurance Company [1997] CLC 909, 916; Symeonides, supra n 1, 
181; JJ Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire North and Fawcett, Private International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 14th edn, 2008), 710; R Fentiman, “The Signifi cance of  Close Connection”, 
in J Ahern and W Binchy (eds), The Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual-
Obligations: A New International Litigation Regime (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), 85, 94.
7 Samcrete Egypt Engineers v Land Rover Exports Limited [2001] ECWA 2019 [37]; British Arab Commer-
cial Bank Plc v Bank of  Communications and Commercial Bank of  Syria [2011] EWHC 281 (Comm) 
[31]; Lawlor v Mining and Construction Mobile Crushers Screens Ltd [2012] EWHC 1188 [53]; Dicey, 
Morris and Collins, Confl ict of  Laws, 1st Suppl (Sweet and Maxwell, 14th edn, 2007), S35-197.
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recent English and Irish court decisions, and existing academic authorities to 
discuss the appropriate way to deploy the escape clause in Rome II. Other 
factors which are considered include the relevance of  a pre-existing relation-
ship between the parties and the accessory connection between a choice of  law 
under a contract while deploying the escape clause under Rome II.
Section E contains the conclusion of  this paper.
B. THE ESCAPE CLAUSE IN THE ROME CONVENTION
Article 3 of  the Rome Convention stipulates that parties to a contract can 
make an express choice of  law or one that can be implied by a court with 
reasonable certainty from the terms of  the contract or the circumstances of  
the case. However, parties to a contract may fail to make a valid choice of  
law. Three of  the main reasons why this happens are:8 fi rst, the parties may 
overlook the possibility of  making a choice of  law to govern their contract; 
secondly, the parties may fail to agree on a choice of  law that governs their 
transaction; and thirdly, there may be vitiating elements such as fraud, illegality 
and duress in reaching the choice of  the applicable law that renders the choice 
of  law made by the parties void.
It is in recognition of  the above problems that Article 4 of  the Rome Con-
vention provides for the determination of  the law that governs a contract in the 
absence of  a choice made by the parties. Article 4(1) provides that the choice 
of  law is to be determined by the law of  the country that is most closely con-
nected with the contract. It also provides that a severable part of  a contract 
which has a closer connection with another country may by way of  exception 
be governed by the law of  that country. This proviso (also known as dépeçage) 
is to be utilised by a court on exceptional grounds, especially where the con-
tract is independent and can be severed from the rest of  the other contracts.9
Article 4(2) provides that subject to Article 4(5) “it shall be presumed that 
the law of  the country that is most closely connected shall be the law of  the 
[habitual residence] of  the party who is to carry out the performance which 
is characteristic of  the contract”. Article 4(5) provides that the presumption in 
paragraph 2 shall not apply if  the “characteristic performance cannot be deter-
mined” and it shall also be disregarded “if  it appears from the circumstances 
as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with another country”.
8 U Magnus, “Article 4 Rome I Regulation: The Applicable Law in the Absence of  Choice”, 
in S Ferrari and S Leible (eds), Rome I Regulation: The Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations in 
Europe (Sellier, 2009), 27.
9 C-133/08 Intercontainer Interfrigo SC (ICF) v Balkenende Oosthuizen [2009] ECR I-9687 [42], [43], 
[45], [46], [48], [49]; Giuliano–Lagarde Report [1980] OJ C282/1, 23
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The determination of  what constitutes the “performance which is charac-
teristic of  the contract” is not explained in the text of  the Rome Convention. 
Giuliano and Lagarde10 in their commentary explained that it “is performance 
for which the payment is due . . . which usually constitutes the centre of  gravity 
and the socio-economic function of  the contractual transaction”. Identifi ca-
tion of  the characteristic performer in unilateral contracts like sales of  goods, 
production of  services and guarantee contracts is not as diffi cult11 as identify-
ing the characteristic performance in complex bilateral transactions involving 
mutual performance such as distributorships, franchise, letters of  credit, joint 
ventures and intellectual property, which appears controversial and near impos-
sible.12 A second disadvantage of  the doctrine is that the habitual residence of  
the characteristic performer may have little or no connection with the contract 
in question.13 Thirdly, the undue preference for the law of  the country of  the 
habitual residence of  the characteristic performer as a presumptive connecting 
factor unfairly downplays the law of  the other party as a connecting factor.14
The advantage of  the doctrine is that the characteristic performer may 
“easily have knowledge in particular without a language barrier, and that on 
which he may legitimately rely”15 on the law of  the place of  his habitual resi-
dence. Secondly, by reason of  its professional activity, the “supplier of  the 
characteristic performance will enter into a large number of  contracts. It there-
fore appears reasonable for practical reasons that all of  the contracts which it 
concludes should be subject to the same law.”16
Having regard to the above pros and cons on the doctrine of  characteristic 
performance, courts of  Member States and academic commentators were in 
disagreement on the proper relationship between Articles 4(2) and 4(5) in deter-
mining the law of  the country that is most closely connected to the contract in 
the absence of  a choice of  law.
Four major approaches feature in judicial opinions and academic writings 
on the appropriate way to utilise the escape clause in the Rome Convention. 
These approaches are (i) the weak presumption approach, (ii) the strong pre-
10 Giuliano–Lagarde Report, ibid, 23.
11 Ibid. Samcrete, supra n 7, [38]; British Arab Commercial Bank plc v BOC [2011] EWHC 28 [31]; 
cf  Golden Ocean Group Limited v Salgaocar Mining Industries PVT Ltd and Salgaocar [2012] EWCA 
Civ 265 [52], where Tomlinson LJ in his leading judgment (with whom the rest of  the Court 
agreed) in the English Court of  Appeal decided that he could not identify the characteristic 
performer in a unilateral contract of  warranty of  authority.
12 Supra n 9, 23. Print Concept GmbH v GEW (EC) Ltd [2001] CLC 352 [34]; Marconi Communica-
tions International v PT Pan Indonesia Bank Ltd [2005] ECWA 422 [61]; Apple Corps Limited v Apple 
Computers Incorporated [2004] 2 CLC 720 [46]–[56].
13 Defi nitely Maybe v Marek Lieberberg [2001] 1 WLR 1745 [12]; Cheshire, North and Fawcett, supra 
n 6, 714–15.
14 Ibid.
15 Intercontainer, supra n 9, Opinion of  AG Bot [45].
16 Ibid, [46]; see generally R Plender and M Wilderspin, European Private International Law of  Obli-
gations (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd edn, 2009), 168–69.
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sumption, (iii) the intermediary approach, and (iv) the doctrine of  commercial 
expectations. These approaches expose the tension between fl exibility and jus-
tice in individual cases on the one hand; and legal certainty, predictability 
and uniformity in addressing choice-of-law problems in commercial trans-
actions under the Rome Convention on the other hand. These approaches are 
reviewed below.
1. The Weak Presumption Approach17
The weak presumption approach has also been labelled as the English, French 
and Danish approach.18 In the case of  Credit Lyonnais, Hobhouse LJ labelled the 
presumption in Article 4(2) as “very weak”.19
English common law was not used to utilising the technique of  using the 
presumption of  characteristic performance to determine the law applicable to 
a contract in the absence of  choice.20 But the principle of  close connection in 
determining the law that applies to a contract was part of  the common law 
and probably infl uenced its approach in the determination of  the applicable 
law in the absence of  choice.21 Thus, English courts were quick to disregard 
the presumption of  characteristic performance in favour of  other connecting 
factors in determining the law that applies to a contract based on deploying the 
escape clause in Article 4(5). The relationship between Article 4(2) and (5) was 
described as “a tie-breaker” that could tilt in favour of  the law of  the country 
that is most closely connected to the contract based on the centre of  gravity 
of  the commercial transaction.22
However, it must be noted that some English courts wanted to be seen as 
paying respect to the presumption in Article 4(2).23 In some other cases, Eng-
lish courts discussed the various approaches to the interpretation of  the escape 
clause under the Rome Convention and claimed to steer a middle course.24 
The underlying and most consistent factor of  the weak presumption approach 
(especially in English cases) can be found in the early proposition of  Dicey and 
17 See generally J Hill, “Choice of  Law in Contract under the Rome Convention: The Approach 
of  the UK Courts” (2004) 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 325; WE O’Brian, 
“Choice of  Law under the Rome Convention: The Dancer or the Dance” [2004] Lloyd’s Mari-
time and Commercial Law Quarterly 375.
18 Intercontainer, supra n 9, opinion of  AG Bot, [73]; Plender and Wilderspin, supra n 16, 174–75.
19 Supra n 6, 914.
20 Dicey, Morris and Collins, supra n 7, vol 2, 1581; Cheshire, North and Fawcett, supra n 6, 708–
09; Plender and Wilderspin, supra n 16, 167–68. The doctrine of  characteristic performance is 
historically a Swiss doctrine.
21 Ibid. Bonython v Australia [1951] AC 201, 221–23; Defi nitely Maybe, supra n 13, [7].
22 Caledonia Subsea Ltd v Microperi Srl 2002 SLT 1022 [28] (Lord President Cullen).
23 Eg Samcrete, supra n 7, [41]; Ennstone Building Products Ltd. v Stranger Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 3059, 
3067, 3070; Opthalmic Innovations Limited (U.K.) v Opthalmic Innovations International Incorporated (USA) 
[2004] EHWC 2948 [48], [49], [53]. 
24 Defi nitely Maybe, supra n 13, [14]–[15].
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Morris; that the presumption in Article 4(2) “may most easily be rebutted in 
those cases where the place of  performance differs from the place of  business 
of  the party whose performance is characteristic of  the contract”.25
Thus, in most English cases, the courts were quick to disregard the presump-
tion in Article 4(2) where the place of  performance differed from the place of  
business of  the party who is to effect the characteristic performance.26 In the 
same vein, it is also observed that an English court refused to disregard the 
presumption in Article 4(2), where the place of  business of  the party who was 
to effect the characteristic performance was also the place of  performance.27
English courts did, however, give consideration to other connecting factors 
such as the country’s currency of  payment;28 the place of  negotiation or con-
clusion of  the contract;29 the place of  residence of  the parties and object of  
the contract;30 and the place of  payment31 in disregarding the presumption; but 
it unduly elevated the place of  performance as a connecting factor in most of  
its decisions.
The advantage of  the weak presumption approach is that it shows that in 
determining the closest connection with the country and contract, the habitual 
residence of  the characteristic performer may in many cases have no connec-
tion with the contract in question.32 Secondly, it made the escape clause in the 
Rome Convention a strong tool in addressing choice-of-law problems in com-
mercial transactions by fl exibly locating the law that is most closely connected 
to the contract in question.
The disadvantage of  the weak presumption approach is that it functionally 
made the presumption in Article 4(2) of  no material signifi cance by disre-
garding it quite often through the deployment of  the escape clause thereby 
undermining legal certainty.33 Secondly, the undue elevation of  the place of  
performance as a special connecting factor in disregarding the presumption in 
25 Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Confl ict of  Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 13th edn, 2000), vol 2, 
32-124. 
26 Credit Lyonnais, supra n 6, 915–16; Bank of  Baroda v Vysa Bank Limited [1994] CLC 41, 47; Defi -
nitely Maybe, supra n 13, [15]; Samcrete, supra n 7, [47]; Kenburn Waste Management Ltd v Bergmann 
[2002] EWCA 99 [20]–[23]; Marconi Communication, supra n 12, [66]; Commercial Marine Piling 
Limited v Pierse Contracting Limited [2009] EHWC 2241 [33]–[37]. Such was the undue elevation 
of  the “place of  performance” as a connecting factor that in Kenburn, ibid, [20]–[23], Walker 
LJ corrected the expression made by the lower court judge who referred to Art 4(2) of  the 
Rome Convention as the “place of  characteristic performance” instead of  “performance which 
is characteristic of  the contract” or the “characteristic performance” as abbreviated in para 5.
27 Iran Continental Shelf  Oil Co Ltd v IRI International Corp [2004] CLC 696 [20], [87]–[91], [94]. 
28 Defi nitely Maybe, supra n 13, [8].
29 Ibid. Opthalmic Innovations, supra n 23, [32], [49].
30 Opthalmic Innovations, supra n 23, [32], [49]. 
31 Samcrete, supra n 7, [47]; Commercial Marine, supra n 26, [33].
32 Defi nitely Maybe, supra n 13, [12].
33 PA De Miguel Asensio, “Applicable Law in the Absence of  Choice to Contracts Relating to 
Intellectual or Industrial Property Rights” (2008) 10 Yearbook of  Private International Law 199, 203.
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Article 4(2) has no textual legitimacy in Article 4 of  the Rome Convention.34 
The place of  performance ought to be considered alongside other material 
connecting factors in determining whether it is justifi able to disregard the pre-
sumption of  characteristic performance in Article 4(2). Thirdly, the escape 
clause was abused in such a way that the law of  the forum was often inter-
preted by courts of  Member States to be the most closely connected law in 
the absence of  choice.35
2. The Strong Presumption Approach
The strong presumption approach has also been labelled as the Dutch and 
Scottish approach.36 The approach was primarily given judicial endorsement 
by the Supreme Court of  the Netherlands in the case of  Société Nouvelle des 
Papeteries de l’AA SA v BV Machinefabriek BOA.37 In that case it was held that the 
escape clause in Article 4(5) should hardly be utilised as “the main rule should 
be disregarded only if, in the special circumstances of  the case, the place of  
business of  the party who is to effect the characteristic performance has no real 
signifi cance as a connecting factor”.38
This trend of  judicial thinking was followed by a majority of  the members 
of  the Court of  Session in the Scottish case of  Caledonia39 who reasoned that 
“the presumption must be strong and only in exceptional circumstances or very 
special circumstances can it be disregarded under Article 4(5)”.40 The majority 
defended the strong presumption approach as advocated by the Dutch Supreme 
Court on three main grounds. First, it supported the underlying objective of  
Article 4 in promoting certainty and uniformity in determining the applicable 
law in the absence of  choice.41 In other words, it was also honouring the claim 
in Article 18 of  the Rome Convention that the Rome Convention should be 
interpreted with an objective international fl avour and not with a domestic 
bias. Secondly, “looking for the law of  the country in which the performance 
takes place is not the primary aim in any determination of  what is to be the 
applicable law”42 as was done by most English Courts. Thirdly, it is only by 
giving considerable weight to the presumption of  characteristic performance 
34 Caledonia, supra n 22, [41].
35 THD Struckyen, “Some Dutch Refl ections on the Rome Convention, Art 4(5)” [1996] Lloyd’s 
Maritime and Commercial Quarterly 18; Samcrete, supra n 7, [42]; E Lein, “The New Rome I/Rome 
II/Brussels I Synergy” (2008) 10 Yearbook of  Private International Law 177, 185. 
36 Intercontainer, supra n 9, Opinion of  AG Bot [71]–[72]. 
37 [1992] Nederlandse jurisprudentie 750; reaffi rmed in Baros AG (Switzerland) v Embrica Martim 
Hotelschiffe GmBH [Hoge Road, 17 October 2008, No C07/037HR; LJN: BE7201]. 
38 Interpreted originally in Struycken, supra n 35, 20. 
39 Caledonia, supra n 22, [3], [6] (Lord Cameron); [2]–[4] (Lord Marnoch); rejected by the English 
Courts in Samcrete, supra n 7, [42] and Marconi Communications, supra n 12, [48]. 
40 Caledonia, supra n 22.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
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in Article 4(2) “that the real and practical effect can be given to the objective 
of  Article 4 . . . namely that of  clarifying and simplifying the law”.43 In other 
words, the constant use of  the escape clause complicated the determination 
of  what the applicable law in a contract should be in the absence of  choice.
The main advantage of  the strong presumption approach is that parties can 
easily determine what law applies to their transaction if  they fail to make a 
choice. It is highly attractive for the parties to make an express choice of  law 
under Article 3 of  the Rome Convention so as to avoid the infl exible rules of  
the strong presumption approach.44
The major criticism of  the strong presumption approach is that it construed 
the relevant phrase in Article 4(5) as if  it were to be read as “manifestly more 
closely connected” and failed to give due consideration to the relevant phrase 
that “if  it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more 
closely connected with another country”, the presumption in paragraph 2 “shall 
be disregarded”. Secondly, the primary aim of  Article 4 of  the Rome Conven-
tion is to determine the law of  the country which is most closely connected to 
the contract in the absence of  choice.45 Thus, the excessive concern with the 
presumption in Article 4(2), where there are other justifi able connecting factors 
that require disregarding the main presumption, makes the strong presump-
tion approach open to objection.46 Thirdly, the strong presumption approach 
made the escape clause in Article 4(5) of  the Rome Convention of  little util-
ity in locating the law of  the country that was most closely connected to the 
contract where the parties for good reasons failed to agree on a choice of  law.
3. Fentiman’s Theory of  Commercial Expectations
Fentiman is credited with expressly propounding the above theory in academic 
writings.47 The theory was further reformulated by Atrill48 and adopted by Fen-
timan in its refi ned form.49 The theory asserts that the true purpose for the 
justifi cation of  the deployment of  the escape clause in disregarding the pre-
sumption of  characteristic performance is not expressly stated in the Rome 
Convention.50 In other words, the Rome Convention neither makes an exhaus-
tive list of  connecting factors that justify using the escape clause nor provides 
43 Ibid.
44 JV Hein, “The Contribution of  the Rome II Regulation to the Communitarisation of  Private 
International Law” (2009) 73(3) RabelsZ 461, 484.
45 Intercontainer, supra n 9, [26], [54].
46 Caledonia, supra n 22, [38] (Lord President Cullen).
47 “Commercial Expectations and the Rome Convention” (Case Comment) (2002) 61(1) Cam-
bridge Law Journal 50; Fentiman, supra n 6, 94–98; R Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation 
(Oxford University Press, 2010), 212–26.
48 S Atrill, “Choice of  Law in Contract: the Missing Pieces of  the Article 4 Jigsaw” (2004) 53(3) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 549.
49 Fentiman, supra n 6, 94–98; Fentiman, supra n 47, 212–26. 
50 Fentiman, supra n 6, 98; Fentiman, supra n 47, 214–16.
Vol. 8 No. 3 Journal of  Private International Law 521
the measure of  signifi cance or weight to be attached to these factors in dis-
regarding the presumption of  characteristic performance.51 The rationale for this 
is that the European drafters of  the Rome Convention did not intend to fetter 
the discretion of  the courts of  Member States in ascertaining what  material 
connecting factors justify the utilisation of  the escape clause in disregarding the 
presumption of  characteristic performance.52 Fentiman states the main purpose 
of  Article 4 of  the Rome Convention is to identify the commercial gravity of  
a contract. Thus, a purposive approach which looks into the socioeconomic 
function of  the contract is required in determining whether the escape clause 
should be utilised in disregarding the presumption in Article 4(2); and not a 
“mere accumulation of  connecting factors” or “an arithmetical preponderance 
of  elements” or “simply a matter of  judicial intuition”.53 The theory posits that 
close connection is a signifi cant connection and “requires a court to give such 
weight to connecting factors as refl ects their practical importance”.54 It is also 
stated that the strong and weak presumption approaches are not useful in this 
task because they offer a deceptive choice between the requirements of  legal 
certainty and fl exibility in commercial transactions.55
Fentiman submits that the purpose of  the escape clause in Article 4(5) of  
the Rome Convention is
“intended to capture a contract’s commercial context and presumably thereby to 
ensure its commercial effectiveness, and indirectly the parties’ expectation that their 
contract shall be commercially viable. The animating principle is that the signifi -
cance of  the relevant connecting factors should be assessed in commercial terms.”56
Thus, it is advocated that in justifying the deployment of  the escape clause 
in disregarding the presumption of  characteristic performance, material con-
necting factors such as the place of  performance or payment, object of  the 
contract, and the closeness of  one contract to another are of  commercial sig-
nifi cance to the parties involved in a contract and should be given due attention 
by the court. However, connecting factors such as the place where the contract 
was negotiated or concluded; the language in which the contract was expressed; 
reference to a foreign law; and the country’s currency of  payment are not of  
any commercial signifi cance to the parties involved in a contract.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Fentiman, supra n 47, 215.
54 Ibid, 217.
55 Atrill, supra n 48, 556.
56 Fentiman, supra n 47, 216. Commercial expectations’ proponents draw support from the cases 
of  Apple Corps Limited, supra n 12, [49], [56]–[64]; Bank of  Baroda, supra n 26, [48]–[49]; Mar-
coni Communications, supra n 12, [62]–[66]; Iran Continental, supra n 27, [73]; Ennstone, supra n 26, 
3067–70; Samcrete, supra n 7, [22], [24], [47]–[51] and Caledonia, supra n 22, [44]. See also British 
Arab, supra n 7, [25]; and Gard Marine and Energy Limited v Glacier Reinsurance AG [2010] EWCA 
Civ 1052 [41], [45].
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The advantage of  the commercial expectations theory is that it offers an 
economically pragmatic solution in justifying which factors are signifi cant or 
material in disregarding the presumption of  characteristic performance in a 
contract where the parties fail to make a choice.
However, it is open to three main objections. First, the doctrine of  commer-
cial expectations has no textual legitimacy in the Rome Convention. Secondly, 
the theory is likely to produce almost as much uncertainty as the weak pre-
sumption approach. The determination of  whether a connecting factor meets 
the commercial expectations of  a contract; or the determination of  the meas-
urement or assessment of  a contract’s commercial signifi cance will in a variety 
of  cases amount to embarking on a voyage of  discovery beyond the scope 
envisaged by the Rome Convention. Thirdly, Article 4(5) is concerned with the 
circumstances as a whole in determining whether the presumption should be 
displaced, and not just the commercial expectation, consequence or effective-
ness of  the contract. In embarking on this exercise the judge ought not to be 
fettered by precedent in determining what type of  factors are signifi cant. For 
example, a factor such as the place of  payment may be a signifi cant factor for 
the creditor in respect of  a contract of  guarantee;57 but may turn out to be 
insignifi cant in another case where no term of  the instrument gave the place 
of  payment contractual effect.58
4. Intermediary Approach
The use of  the intermediary approach in deploying the escape clause in the 
Rome Convention featured in the dissenting opinion of  Lord President Cullen 
in Caledonia.59 Most recently, the CJEU in Intercontainer60 gave legitimacy to the 
intermediary approach. The intermediary approach postulates that both the 
weak and strong presumption approaches are open to objection as they are 
extreme versions of  what is intended in the Rome Convention.61 This approach 
recognises that there is an underlying dilemma and tension between achieving 
the goals of  legal certainty and predictability in commercial transactions on the 
one hand; and fl exibility and justice on the other hand. It advocates that the 
primary consideration in Article 4 of  the Rome Convention is the determina-
tion of  the law that is most closely connected with a contract in the absence 
of  choice.62 The presumption of  characteristic performance in Article 4(2) is 
57 Samcrete, supra n 7, [47].
58 British Arab, supra n 7, [35]. Furthermore, “currency of  payment” and the “place of  negotia-
tion and conclusion of  the contract”, which is regarded as an insignifi cant connecting factor 
by commercial expectations’ proponents was utilised as a signifi cant factor in Defi nitely Maybe, 
supra n 13, [8] and Opthalmic Innovations, supra n 23, [32], [49]. 
59 Caledonia, supra n 22, [35]–[41].
60 Intercontainer, supra n 9. 
61 Caledonia, supra n 22, [35].
62 Intercontainer, supra n 9, [55], [60].
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aimed at achieving the goals of  legal certainty and foreseeability in the contract 
between the parties with regard to determining the law that is most closely con-
nected to the contract in the absence of  choice.63 The escape clause in Article 
4(5) is aimed at achieving the goal of  fl exibility and justice in individual cases 
by leaving a margin of  discretion for a judge to disregard the presumption in 
Article 4(2) if  there are other connecting factors that justify such an exercise.64
The relationship between Article 4(2) and Article 4(5) involves a coun-
terbalance between the requirements of  legal certainty and predictability in 
commercial transactions on the one hand, and the requirements of  fl exibil-
ity and justice on the other.65 Thus, Article 4(2) shall only be disregarded if  it 
appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract does not have any 
genuine connecting value or is more closely connected with another country;66 
or it is demonstrated that there is a “clear preponderance of  facts in favour of  
another country”.67 The intermediary approach as advocated by Lord President 
Cullen in Caledonia and the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (CJEU) in 
Intercontainer is the appropriate, “literal”68 or “natural meaning”69 of  the deploy-
ment of  the escape clause in the Rome Convention. The approach is sound 
and has textual legitimacy in the Rome Convention.
The main advantage of  the intermediary approach is that it steers a middle 
course between meeting the requirements of  legal certainty and predictability 
in commercial transactions on the one hand, and the requirements of  fl exibility 
and justice on the other.
However, its major shortcoming is that it does not suffi ciently describe the 
threshold of  displacement under Article 4(5). Thus, it is susceptible to manipu-
lation and infi ltration by both the weak and strong presumption approaches. In 
other words, both the weak or strong presumption judicial disciples can claim 
that they are honouring the intermediary approach as decided by the CJEU 
in Intercontainer but they can still functionally deploy their extreme versions of  
the escape clause under the Rome Convention.70 This shortcoming is under-
standable and excusable. Creating an exhaustive list of  signifi cant factors that 
determines the threshold of  displacement ultimately fetters the discretion of  
the judge or decision-maker, and may lead to injustice in individual cases. As 
stated earlier, a signifi cant factor in one case may turn out to be insignifi cant 
63 Ibid, [61].
64 Ibid, [58].
65 Ibid, [59].
66 Ibid, [61].
67 Caledonia, supra n 22, [41].
68 PR Beaumont and PE Mc Eleavy, Private International Law AE Anton (W Green, 3rd edn, 2011), 
477–78.
69 Fentiman, supra n 47, 611.
70 See generally P Rogerson, “Confl ict of  Laws” [2009] All England Annual Review 5 [5.38]. 
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when dealing with the same or another type of  contract in the circumstances 
of  the case.
The primary concern of  the judge is to weigh the signifi cance of  the con-
nections between the contract and the circumstances of  the case and the 
putative law of  closest connection. Where the weight of  these connections are 
evenly balanced with, or are outweighed by, the connections with the law of  
the country selected by the application of  the presumption under Article 4(2), 
then the escape clause should not be deployed.
(a) The Nexus between the Escape Clause and Implied Choice of  Law under the Rome 
Convention
Despite the CJEU in Intercontainer providing a guide as to how the escape clause 
should be utilised under the Rome Convention, there are some unresolved mat-
ters that still require specifi c answers from the CJEU. Under Article 3(1) of  the 
Rome Convention a court can imply a choice of  law if  it is demonstrated with 
reasonable certainty from the terms of  the contract and the circumstances of  
the case. A court cannot infer the existence of  a choice of  law as could be done 
under the common law. Thus, a court can refer to an express choice of  court 
or arbitration clause; or a standard form contract such as the Lloyds Marine 
Insurance in England; or a previous course of  dealings between the parties; or 
an express choice of  law in a related transaction; or a reference to particular 
rules in a statute to imply a choice of  law.71
It has caused a great deal of  controversy among English judges as to whether 
the factors utilised in determining the existence of  an implied choice of  law 
can be utilised in invoking the escape clause to displace the presumption of  
characteristic performance. This controversy has survived the decision of  the 
CJEU in Intercontainer. Hobhouse LJ in Credit Lyonnais was of  the view that once 
the court cannot imply a choice of  law under Article 3(1) of  the Convention 
“the question of  choice and absence of  choice becomes irrelevant to the ques-
tion of  ascertaining with what state the contract is most closely connected”.72 
He stated further that such an approach wrongly shifts the focus to “considera-
tions of  inferred choice and connections with legal systems and not with the 
71 See generally Giuliano and Lagarde, supra n 9, 17; CMV Clarkson and J Hill, The Confl ict of  
Laws (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2006), 177–83 for an exhaustive discussion of  these fac-
tors. The use of  the law governing a closely related contract (eg letters of  credit, guarantee and 
insurance contract) appears to be the most prominent connecting factor in English case law to 
determine whether the presumption under Art 4(2) of  the Convention should be displaced. See 
generally the cases of  Wahda Bank v Arab Bank plc [1996] CLC 408; Bank of  Baroda v Vysa Bank 
Limited [1994] CLC 4 [48]–[49]; Emeraldian Limited Partnership v Wellmix Shipping Limited [2010] 
EWHC 1411 [171]; Golden Ocean Group Limited v Salgaocar Mining Industries PVT Limited [2011] 
EHWC 56 (Comm) [134]–[135]; Gard Marine, supra n 56, [39]–[47]; British Arab Commercial, supra 
n 7, [32]–[34]; Cox v Ergo Versicherung AG (formerly Victoria) [2012] EWCA Civ 1001 [12]–[13].
72 Credit Lyonnais, supra n 6, [916].
Vol. 8 No. 3 Journal of  Private International Law 525
question of  performance and location of  the performing parties”.73 Potter LJ 
in Samcrete took a tentative view that utilising factors in determining an implied 
choice of  law in deploying the escape clause fails to distinguish the proper role 
of  Articles 3(1) and 4(5) under the Rome Convention.74
After the decision in Intercontainer, the High Court in Emeraldian Limited, in 
disregarding the presumption of  characteristic performance (which was in 
favour of  the habitual residence of  the guarantor), automatically utilised factors 
that determine the existence of  an implied choice of  law while deploying the 
escape clause.75 The Court of  Appeal in Gard Marine, per Thomas LJ applied 
the same approach in disregarding the presumption of  Swiss law under Article 
4(2) by holding that English law was most closely connected with a reinsurance 
contract.76 The High Court in British Arab, relying on Gard Marine, held that
“the tentative view in Samcrete is overtaken by events by the reasoning in Intercontainer 
Interfi go. The court is not precluded from taking into account any particular type of  
factor when applying Article 4(5) and is not required to look at the contract in isola-
tion from other contracts with which it is connected.”77
The Court of  Appeal, per Tomlinson LJ in Golden Ocean, overturned the 
approach of  the High Court,78 per Clarke J, who followed the Court of  Appeal’s 
approach in Credit Lyonnais and Samcrete. Tomlinson LJ justifi ed his decision on 
the ground that a contract of  warranty of  authority is a special and unique 
case where utilising the escape clause in terms of  legal systems and not the 
location of  the performing parties is a legitimate exercise.79 In the case of  
Lawlor80 the High Court held that in utilising the escape clause “the court is 
concerned with the circumstances as a whole not simply with the pointers to 
a potential choice of  law”.81
Having regard to the above confl icting English authorities on the nexus 
between potential factors for determining an implied choice of  law and the 
escape clause under the Convention, the following submissions are made. First, 
the escape clause in the Rome Convention is couched in terms of  the connec-
73 Ibid.
74 Samcrete, supra n 7, [34].
75 Emeraldian, supra n 71, [171].
76 Gard Marine, supra n 56, [46]. Cf Cox, supra n 71, [12]–[13], where the Court of  Appeal utilised 
factors that determine a potential choice of  law in justifying why the presumption under Arti-
cle 4(2) should not be displaced.
77 British Arab, supra n 7 [34].
78 Golden Ocean, supra n 71, [134]–[136]. 
79 Golden Ocean, supra n 11, [52]. He distinguished the approach taken in Credit Lyonnais and Sam-
crete as inapplicable to a contract of  warranty of  authority.
80 Lawlor, supra n 7.
81 Ibid, [60].
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tion between the “contract” and a “country” and not the connection between 
the “contract” and a “legal system”.82
Secondly, there is no aspect of  the decision in Intercontainer that legitimises 
the use of  factors that determine an implied choice of  law to trump the pre-
sumption under Article 4(2). Looking at the circumstances as a whole does not 
necessarily mean the court should import considerations for a potential choice 
of  law, where these factors are irrelevant in deploying the escape clause.
Thirdly, it is an illegitimate exercise to automatically use factors that deter-
mine the existence of  an implied choice of  law to displace the presumption of  
characteristic performance, where these factors are irrelevant or insignifi cant in 
deploying the escape clause. It creates uncertainty in making the presumption 
functionally weak and obscures the distinction between a choice of  law and law 
in the absence of  choice.
Fourthly, the circumstances of  the case should determine whether poten-
tial factors used in determining an implied choice of  law can also be utilised 
in invoking the escape clause. For example, Lawlor 83 concerned the law that 
should govern the agency relationship between the parties. The characteris-
tic performer (the agent) carried out the bulk of  his obligations in Spain. The 
place of  performance of  the agency was largely concentrated in Spain and 
the connection with other countries such as England was very tenuous. How-
ever, every contract the parties entered into was governed by English law save 
for their employment and agency contracts. The High Court rightly held that 
under Article 4(5) the Spanish connection was much deeper and more exten-
sive than that of  England even though there were some pointers to a potential 
implied choice of  law that were not strong enough to constitute such a choice 
under Article 3.
In Gard Marine 84 the characteristic performer in the reinsurance contract 
was located in Switzerland. However, there were connections with England 
showing that the reinsurance involved a London Market placement (and not 
one separate Swiss placement); the expiring excess of  loss reinsurance was a 
London market placement; the renewal was a London market placement; and 
that the underlying policy was governed by English law. Thus, the Court of  
Appeal decided that there was a real choice of  English law under Article 3 of  
the Rome Convention.85 If  the Court of  Appeal were to be overturned on its 
82 This underlies the difference between Art 4(5) of  the Rome Convention and Art 4(4) of  Rome 
I. Art 4(4) is concerned with the “law of  the country” with which the contract has its closest 
connection – which is similar to the default rule in Art 4(1) of  the Rome Convention. Art 4(5) 
of  the Rome Convention and Art 4(3) of  Rome I are concerned with the country with which 
the contract is more (or manifestly more) closely connected with in displacing the main rule. See 
generally Beaumont and McEleavy, supra n 68, 461–63.
83 Lawlor, supra n 7, [59]–[60].
84 Gard Marine, supra n 56.
85 Ibid, [37]–[45].
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Article 3 decision, it took the view that English law should be applied as Eng-
land was the country most closely connected to the contract under Article 4(5) 
of  the Rome Convention for the reasons given by the court in respect of  the 
considerations under Article 3.86
Based on the fourth submission, it is the view here that the Court of  
Appeal’s decision in Golden Ocean is open to objection. The case (among others) 
concerned the law applicable to a contract of  warranty with a third party. 
There was a contest as to the applicability of  English law or Indian Law to 
the relationship. The High Court per Clarke J rightly focused on the relation-
ship between the parties to the contract of  the warranty of  authority; and held 
that since the parties were both habitually resident in India, where the said 
authority was alleged to have been secured, Indian law should be the applica-
ble law. Furthermore, Indian law would ordinarily be the applicable law if  the 
challenge to the existence of  a contract with the third party was successful.87 
The Court of  Appeal per Tomlinson LJ in overturning this part of  Clarke J’s 
judgment took the position that since the principal contract in question con-
cerned the contract of  guarantee and charter party, which were both governed 
by English law, the ancillary contract involving the alleged breach of  a contract 
of  warranty of  authority should also be governed by English law.88 Tomlinson 
LJ was happy to arrive at that conclusion by implying a choice of  English law 
to the contract of  warranty of  authority under Article 3 of  the Rome Conven-
tion, even though this point was not argued before the judge or the Court of  
Appeal, but felt that the same result could be arrived at under Article 4(5).89
It is respectfully submitted that this is a case where utilising the factors for 
a potential implied choice of  law under Article 3 should have been irrelevant 
in deploying the escape clause under Article 4(5). The Court of  Appeal ought 
to have focused on the main contract of  warranty of  authority (as the lower 
court did) instead of  concerning itself  with the existence of  the applicability of  
English law to the contract of  guarantee and charter party. The third party had 
86 Ibid, [46]–[47]. Cf Cox, supra n 71, [12]–[13]. In Cox there was a contention as to whether 
German law or English law applied to the assignment of  a cause of  action by the claimant 
to the Ministry of  Defence (MOD) in England, involving a fatal accident of  a British service-
man (claimant’s husband) killed in a road accident while posted in Germany. The claimant was 
habitually resident with the deceased in Germany at the date of  the assignment. The assign-
ment was intended to enable the MOD in England to recoup from the tortfeasor, who was a 
German national or the deceased’s German insurer. The cost of  the outlays arising from the 
accident and those claims were governed by German law. The Court of  Appeal held on these 
facts that the connection with Germany outweighed that of  England, and German law was 
the applicable law under Art 3(1). The Court of  Appeal rightly that the same results would be 
reached under Art 4 in refusing to displace the presumption of  Art 4(2) in favour of  English 
law, as Germany was the country with which the assignment was most closely connected.
87 Golden Ocean, supra n 71, [136].
88 Golden Ocean, supra n 11, [52]–[54].
89 Ibid, [49].
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no proximate relationship with the contract of  warranty of  authority, which 
was an entirely separate issue in the case.90
Consequently, in view of  the confusion and uncertainty created between the 
nexus of  potential factors for an implied choice of  law and the escape law, it is 
proposed that the doctrine of  implied choice of  law should be deleted in the 
revised version of  the Rome I. 91 Either the parties make an express choice of  
law to govern their contract or they do not make one. The objection to this 
proposal is that it creates a narrow view on party autonomy.
This objection to this proposal is outweighed by four main considerations. 
First (as demonstrated above), it has caused a great deal of  confusion among 
English courts as to when a court should imply a choice of  law or apply the 
default rule. Secondly, it is uncertain what factors are principally (or primarily) 
to be utilised in determining an implied choice of  law or deploying the escape 
clause.92 Thirdly, where the parties have not made an express choice of  law, 
the court is ultimately left with the decision of  determining the applicable law 
either by implying a choice of  law or determining it by default; and factors that 
are used in determining if  the parties had implied a choice of  law may turn 
out to be relevant or signifi cant in deploying the escape clause. Fourthly, some 
English courts that reach a decision that the parties made an implied choice of  
law move on to consider what their decision would be if  they had been wrong 
that a choice of  law could not be implied by the parties.93
It is submitted that this proposal would create a balance between certainty 
and fl exibility. It would be a strong attraction for the parties to make an express 
choice of  law to govern their contract or leave it for the court to decide. The 
90 Furthermore, the contract of  guarantee and charter party, and that of  the contract of  war-
ranty of  authority, should not have been grouped as closely related contracts. The contract of  
warranty of  authority was primarily concerned with whether one of  the parties to the con-
tract had warranted his authority for his company to enter into a contract with a third party. 
The existence of  a contract of  guarantee and charter party and the existence or validity of  the 
company entering into that contract was another issue. The contract of  warranty of  authority 
should clearly have been severed.
91 Art 3(1) of  Rome I still preserves the doctrine of  implied choice of  law. The only difference 
is that Art 3(1) of  Rome I adds the word “clearly”. It is submitted the addition of  the words 
“clearly” does not materially change the intended effect of  the implied choice being “demon-
strated with reasonable certainty from the terms of  the contract and the circumstances of  the 
case”. In this regard, Fentiman, supra n 47, 196 rightly submits that the addition of  the word 
“clearly” in Art 3 of  Rome I “may simply articulate more precisely what was always contem-
plated”.
 
92 For example uncertainty has been created as to whether closely related contracts belong to Arts 
3 or 4. Giuliano-Lagarde, supra n 9, 17 groups such factors as matters under Art 3, but recit-
als 20 and 21 to Rome I expressly group it under Art 4. See generally Fentiman, supra n 47, 
200–01.
93 When English courts adopt this approach, they reach the decision that the implied choice of  
law is more closely connected with the contract in applying the escape clause. The inference 
to be drawn is that the courts that adopt this approach are not sure a choice of  law can be 
implied between the parties with reasonable certainty. Secondly, the court can achieve the same 
result in implying a choice of  law or determining it in the absence of  choice.
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deletion of  the doctrine of  implied choice of  law would not bar the court 
from considering any factor (including potentials for an implied choice of  law), 
where it is relevant or signifi cant in determining the country that is manifestly 
more closely connected with the contract.
C. THE ESCAPE CLAUSE IN THE ROME I REGULATION
Rome I presents a different structure from the Rome Convention on the deter-
mination of  the law that applies to a contract between the parties in the absence 
of  choice. Due to strong criticisms regarding the abuse of  the escape clause 
in the Rome Convention to mostly favour the law of  the forum of  Member 
States and its leading to so much uncertainty, the Commission’s proposal had 
initially favoured the complete abolition of  the escape clause from Rome I.94 It 
is believed that it was criticisms from the academic community that saved the 
escape clause in Rome I from extinction.95
Article 4(1) of  Rome I presents a structure of  fi xed rules (as opposed to pre-
sumptions in the Rome Convention) in determining the law that applies to the 
contract of  the parties in the absence of  choice.96 Article 4(2) functions as an 
exception to Article 4(1) by providing that the contract shall be governed by 
the law of  the country of  the habitual residence of  the party who is to carry 
out the characteristic performance based on two conditions.97 The fi rst is where 
“the contract is not covered by paragraph 1”. The second is where “the ele-
ments would be covered by more than one of  the points (a) to (h) of  paragraph 
1”. The escape clause is provided for in Article 4(3) to the effect that where “it 
is clear from all the circumstances of  the case that the contract is manifestly 
more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 
1 or 2, the law of  that other country shall apply”. Article 4(4) of  Rome I pro-
vides that where “law applicable cannot be determined pursuant to paragraphs 
1 or 2, the contract shall be governed by the law of  the country with which it 
is most closely connected”.
The difference between Article 4(3) and Article 4(4) is that while Article 
4(3) is concerned with displacing the applicable rules in Article 4(1) and (2) in 
94 Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable 
to contractual obligations (Rome I), 15 December 2005, COM(2005) 650 fi nal, Art 4.
95 S Dutson, “A Dangerous Proposal: The European Commission’s Attempt to Amend the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations” [2006] Journal of  Business Law 608, 610–14; Hein, supra 
n 44, 483–84; Cheshire, North and Fawcett, supra n 6, 724. However, Member States in the 
Council were not keen on the Commission’s proposal to abolish the escape clause. The pro-
posal had not been based on a proper academic or empirical study.
96 It lists eight categories of  contract such as contract of  sale, provision of  services, immovable 
property, distributorship, franchise, auction sales and fi nancial instruments in which the law of  
the country of  one of  the parties is to apply.
97 Recital 19 to Rome I.
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favour of  the country that is manifestly more closely connected with contract, 
Article 4(4) is concerned with locating the law of  the country that has the clos-
est connection with the contract without concerning itself  with displacing the 
applicable rules in Article 4(1) and (2).98 The candidates for the closest con-
nection test are contracts that do not fall within the fi xed rules in Article 4(1), 
such as letters of  credit transactions; and complex contracts involving mutual 
obligations where the characteristic performer proves diffi cult or impossible to 
identify such as in joint venture intellectual property transactions, and transfers 
of  shares.99
Rome I does not expressly provide a role for dépeçage as did the Rome Con-
vention, but there remains an argument as to whether its existence is still 
preserved to be left at the discretion of  courts of  Member States.100 The view 
held here is that dépeçage has no place in Rome I based on two main reasons. 
First, it is not expressly mentioned in Article 4 of  Rome I.101 Secondly, the 
high bar set by the CJEU in Intercontainer in stating that splitting the applica-
ble law (which is expressly provided for in Article 4 of  the Rome Convention) 
should only be deployed on exceptional grounds is good reason to hold that 
98 Scott v West and others; Mackie v Baxter and Others [2012] EWHC 1890 (Ch) [10]–[11]; see gener-
ally Beaumont and McEleavy, supra n 68, 483–87.
99 Scott, ibid; Apple Corps Limited, supra n 12, [47]–[64]. The latter case involved a trade mark 
agreement imposing negative obligations on the parties. The High Court could not identify the 
characteristic performer under Art 4(2) of  the Rome Convention and applied the law of  the 
country that was most closely connected with the contract through the default rule in Art 4(1) 
of  the Rome Convention. This case will prove to be useful in interpreting Art 4(4) of  Rome I. 
Beaumont and McEleavy, ibid, make an interesting comparison between CJEU cases on the 
Brussels I Regulation – Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of  22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction 
and the Recognition and Enforcement of  Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2001] 
OJ L12/1 (“Brussels I”) that discussed the determination of  characteristic performance under 
Art 5(1) of  Brussels I and rightly submit that a happy synergy can be created by utilising such 
decisions as a guide in determining whether Art 4(4) of  Rome I should be resorted to. The 
CJEU case of  Car Trim GmbH v Key Safety Systems (C-381/08) [2010] ECR I-1255 [40]–[43] 
indicated some criteria for distinguishing a sale of  goods contract from that of  provision of  
services in determining whether it should be grouped as a contract in which the characteristic 
performer can be identifi ed. Falco Privatsitung and Rabitsch v Weller-Lindhorst (C-533/07) [2010] 
ECR I-3327 [36], [41] made a negative pronouncement excluding a contract under which the 
owner of  an intellectual property right granted its partner the licence to use that right in return 
for remuneration as not being a contract for the provision of  services. In the English case of  
Reliance Globacom Ltd v International Solutions SA [2011] EHWC 1848 (QB) [12], the High Court 
held that a contract for recovery of  outstanding charges to buy capacity on cable network was 
one in which the characteristic performer could not be identifi ed under Article 5(1)(b) of  Brus-
sels I.
100 Plender and Wilderspin, supra n 16, 177; De Miguel Asensio, supra n 33, 201; Magnus, supra n 
8, 31; A Mills, “The Application of  Multiple Laws under the Rome II Regulation”, in Ahern 
and Binchy, supra n 6, 133, 149–50. 
101  In the Irish case of  ICDL GCC Foundation FZ-LLC and others v European Computer Driving Licence 
Foundation Ltd [2011] IEHC 343 [9.7]–[9.8] the High Court per Clarke J held that Article 4 of  
Rome II does not provide for dépeçage (as regards deploying the escape clause) since there is no express 
mention of  its use. 
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the absence of  the mention of  its use in Article 4 of  Rome I means that it is 
not to be resorted to.
It is advocated here that the escape clause in Rome I functions in a way 
similar to the strong presumption approach as opposed to the other three 
approaches identifi ed in the interpretation of  the escape clause in the Rome 
Convention.
1. The Resurrection of  the Strong Presumption Approach
The recent CJEU decision in Intercontainer marked the death of  the strong pre-
sumption approach in the Rome Convention, though it appears that it has 
been resurrected in Rome I. It is conceded that at the moment no judicial 
authority has been identifi ed that gives legitimacy to the above opinion. How-
ever, having regard to some striking similarities between the phraseology of  
the doctrine of  characteristic performance and the escape clause in the Rome 
Convention and Rome I, it is appropriate to use the case law authorities from 
the Rome Convention and recent academic treatises on Rome I to determine 
the appropriate interpretation of  the escape clause in Rome I.
There is a school of  thought that holds the opinion that the weak presump-
tion approach may still play a role in the utilisation of  the escape clause in 
Rome I. The opinion is premised on the fact that it is only the structure of  
Rome I that has changed and not really its content. Thus, courts of  Member 
States “will continue to be confronted with the diffi cult task of  ‘counting’ and 
‘weighing’ the contacts existing between the contractual relationship and the 
countries involved”.102
Fentiman seeks to fi nd a place for the theory of  commercial expectations 
in Rome I.103 Fentiman also places emphasis on recitals 20 and 21 to Rome I 
which provide that in order to determine the law of  the country with which 
the contract is most closely connected, account should be taken, among other 
things, of  “whether the contract in question has a very close relationship with 
another contract or contracts”. Fentiman submits that the “reason is important. 
It avoids the commercially detrimental result that related contracts are gov-
erned by different laws. Implicitly commercial effectiveness animates the search 
102 A Bonomi, “The Rome I Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations – Some 
General Remarks” (2008) 10 Yearbook of  Private International Law 175; see generally Cheshire, 
North and Fawcett, supra n 6, 725; P Charles, “The Evolution of  Rome” (2010) 160 New Law 
Journal 61, 62; E Chvika, “Rome I: Uncertainty on the Horizon of  Cross-Border Finance 
Transaction” (2009) 3 Journal of  International Banking and Financial Law 152, 155; E Crawford, 
“Applicable Law of  Contract: Some Changes Ahead” (2010) 4 Scots Law Times 17, 19, 22; Rog-
erson, supra n 70, [5.38]. Most of  those who belong to this school of  thought reached their 
opinion before the recent decision of  the CJEU in Intercontainer, which abolished the doctrine 
of  the weak presumption approach under the Rome Convention.
103 Fentiman, supra n 6, 94–98; Fentiman, supra n 47, 213–26.
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for the applicable law”.104 Fentiman further states that in “determining the law 
applicable to any given contract the existence of  a related contract, connected 
with a given country, is thus of  commercial considerable signifi cance”.105 Thus, 
in a letter of  credit transaction the same law should govern contracts between 
the issuing bank and benefi ciary, confi rming bank and benefi ciary, issuing bank 
and confi rming bank.106
For reasons earlier advanced on the inappropriateness of  using the weak 
presumption approach and theory of  commercial expectations in the Rome 
Convention, it is submitted they do not have textual legitimacy in Rome I.107
There is another school of  thought that is of  the opinion that the inter-
mediary approach is favoured in Rome I and its adherents advance strong 
reasons for their opinion.108 First, the rules in Article 4(1) and (2) are aimed at 
legal certainty and foreseeability in the relationship between parties to a com-
mercial transaction, while the escape clause in Article 4(3) retains a degree 
of  fl exibility to displace the rules in Article 4(1) and (2) where the country is 
manifestly more closely connected with the contract. Thus, it represents a bal-
ance between requirements of  legal certainty and fl exibility as handed down 
by the CJEU in Intercontainer, which is what the intermediary approach aims at. 
Secondly, Article 4 of  Rome I is said to honour the claim contained in recital 
16 to Rome I, which has the objective of  legal certainty and foreseeable rules, 
while retaining “a degree of  discretion to determine the law that is most closely 
104 Fentiman, supra n 6, 95.
105 Fentiman, supra n 47, 218.
106 What if  the issuing bank and benefi ciary expressly choose English law to govern their contract, 
the confi rming bank and benefi ciary choose French law expressly to govern their contract; 
but the confi rming bank and issuing bank make no express choice of  law? Certainly, neither 
English law nor French law could automatically lay claim as being manifestly more closely con-
nected with the contract. Other connecting factors (not just in commercial terms) between the 
issuing bank and confi rming bank such as the place of  payment and performance, terms of  
the contract and object of  the contract, place of  negotiation and conclusion of  the contract 
and geographical location of  the parties will weigh on the mind of  the court in deploying the 
escape clause. In British Arab, supra n 7, Blair J was faced with an almost similar circumstance, 
where the counter-guarantee given by C to E was governed by English law. The guarantee 
between S and C was governed by Syrian law. However, the counter-guarantee given by E to 
S contained no express choice-of-law clause and there was a contention as to whether English 
law or Syrian law applied. Blair J decided that there was no real choice of  Syrian or English 
law under Art 3 of  the Rome Convention [30]. The court then turned its attention to Art 4 
of  the Rome Convention and rightly refused to deploy the escape clause in favour of  Syrian 
law because the guarantee between S and C was governed by Syrian law. It also did not uti-
lise the escape clause in favour of  English law because the counter-guarantee given by C to E 
was governed by English Law. The court reached its decision on other grounds by deploying 
the escape clause in favour of  Syrian Law [35].
 
107 See infra, Section B.
108 O Lando and PA Nielsen, “The Rome I Proposal” (2007) 3 Journal of  Private International Law 
29, 38; Cheshire, North and Fawcett, supra 6, 725; ZS Tang , “Law Applicable in the Absence 
of  Choice: The New Article 4 of  the Rome I Regulation” (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 785, 
798; Beaumont and McEleavy, supra n 68, 475.
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connected” to the contractual relationship in the absence of  a choice made by 
the parties. Thirdly, it is also argued that the strong presumption approach is
“not even consistent with the much tighter wording of  the Rome I Regulation 
because it is possible for the law indicated by the presumption (rule under Rome 
I) to have ‘real signifi cance’ and yet for another law to be ‘manifestly’ more closely 
connected to the contract.”109
It is submitted that although the escape clause in Rome I is theoretically aimed 
at an intermediary approach, its phraseology and textual operation makes it 
function in practice as one that is similar to the strong presumption approach.110
First, the escape clause does not need to be resorted to very often as Article 
4(1) and (2) may often have suffi cient connection to the dispute to justify its 
application. Secondly, the use of  the phrases “clear from all the circumstances 
of  the case” and “manifestly more closely connected” in Article 4(3) of  Rome 
I indicates that the escape clause is an exceptional remedy that is to be rarely 
utilised in determining the law of  a country that applies to a contract between 
the parties in the absence of  choice.111 In other words, the escape clause should 
not be utilised if  the connecting factors with the law of  another country are 
of  similar weight to those indicated by the rules in Article 4(1) or (2).112 The 
109 Beaumont and P McEleavy, ibid.
110 See generally De Miguel Asensio, supra n 33, 204; Magnus, supra n 8, 48; Plender and Wilder-
spin, supra n 16, 196; G. Alferez, “The Rome I Regulation: Much Ado About Nothing?” (2008) 
2 European Legal Forum 61, 70; http://www.cjel.net/online/15_2-vernooij/. Accessed on 17 July 
2011. NW Vernooij, “Rome I: An Update on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations in 
Europe” (2009) 15 Columbia Journal of  European Law 71, 75; A Briggs, “When in Rome, Choose 
as the Romans Choose” (2009) 125 Law Quarterly Review 191, 192. In taking the position that 
Rome I is similar to the strong presumption approach, the writers should not be misunder-
stood as adopting the approach of  the Dutch and Scottish Courts under the Rome Convention, 
which states the escape clause should only be utilised where the presumption has no signifi -
cance as a connecting factor.
111 See the Explanatory memorandum from the Commission, accompanying the Proposal for 
Rome II, COM(2003) 427 fi nal (Explanatory Memorandum) 12.
112  For example in British Arab, supra n 7, there was a contest as to whether the applicable law to 
the contract of  counter-guarantee between E and S was English or Syrian law. The character-
istic performer was E, who was the guarantor under the contract. In a bid to utilise the escape 
clause, E relied on the following signifi cant connecting factors: (i) any claim or demand by S 
for payment under the counter-guarantee would have to reach E in London; (ii) any payment 
by E to S was due to be made in S’s account in London, (iii) the key element of  performance 
under the counter-guarantee was the honouring of  the undertaking of  E as guarantor, which 
was located in England. However, S relied on the following signifi cant connecting factors: (i) 
the underlying contract and infrastructure project was in Syria; (ii) the place of  payment under 
the bond was to be in Syria; (iii) the fact that for the counter-guarantee to be triggered there 
must be a “claim” under the performance bond, and what counts as a claim was a matter of  
Syrian law. Although Blair J relied on the last connecting factor as very material in displacing 
the presumption of  English law in favour of  Syrian law, it is submitted here that under Rome 
I, having regard to the fact that the connecting factors between Syria and England were evenly 
balanced and competed favourably with each other, it should be a clear case where the High 
Court should hold that Syria was not manifestly closer to the contract to displace the presump-
tion of  English law.
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preponderance of  other connecting factors required in displacing the rules 
in Article 4(1) or (2) must be overwhelming, very signifi cant or “obvious and 
natural”.113 Connecting factors such as the object of  the contract, place of  per-
formance, place of  common residence or nationality of  the parties and business 
of  the parties may constitute strong reasons for invoking the escape clause.114
Another signifi cant connecting factor is that expressly identifi ed in recitals 20 
and 21 to Rome I, which is based on a contract that has a very close relation-
ship with another contract or contracts. This provision may make the escape 
clause “more readily satisfi ed than on fi rst sight”.115 Contracts that readily come 
to mind are letters of  credit transactions, guarantee agreements and insur-
ance that both involve a multiple of  independent contracts between the parties 
involved. Thus, the judicial authorities used in the Rome Convention in respect 
of  closely related contracts will be of  relevance in Rome I.116
Finally, it should be noted that it is easier to use the escape clause in Article 
4(3) to displace Article 4(2), than Article 4(1).117 But there remains a possibility 
that the escape clause in Article 4(3) can be successfully invoked to trump the 
fi xed rules of  Article 4(1) as its sphere of  application is not restricted to para-
graph 2 but “that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2” of  Rome I.118
2. Implications of  the Difference in Approach between the 
Rome Convention and Rome I
The escape clause in Rome I tilts towards more certainty and less fl exibility. 
The major disadvantage of  this is that Article 4 of  Rome I has “overstretched 
the aspect of  certainty and disregarded too much the aspect of  the fl exibil-
ity and justice to the single case”.119 Secondly, favouring the law of  one party 
as being applicable to the contract as opposed to the law of  the other party 
113 Tang, supra n 108, 800. The case of  Gard Marine, supra n 56, is a clear example where the con-
necting factors were overwhelming, very signifi cant and obviously in favour of  applying the law 
of  England to displace the presumption of  characteristic performance that was in favour of  
Swiss law. The reinsurance contract substantially revolved around England. The reinsurance 
involved a London market placement (and not a separate Swiss placement); the expiring excess 
of  loss reinsurance was a London market placement; the renewal was a London market place-
ment; and the underlying policy was governed by English law. The same results would likely 
be reached under Rome I. Cf  Cox, supra n 71, [12]–[13]
114 See generally De Miguel Asensio, supra n 33, 219. 
115 Vernooij, supra n 110, 76; cf Tang, supra n 108, 799.
116 Bank of  Baroda, supra n 26, [48]–[49]; Marconi Communications, supra n 12, [61]; Habib Bank v CBS 
[2006] EWHC 1767 [44]; Gard Marine, supra n 56, [40]–[45]; Golden Ocean, supra n 11, [42]–
[45]. 
117 The principal reason is that the types of  case where Art 4(2) has to be resorted to are not the 
straightforward ones that fi t neatly into the fi xed rules in Art 4(1) and therefore by defi nition it 
will often be hard to identify the characteristic performer. Such unusual and complex contracts 
are more likely to have another law that might be manifestly more closely connected than the 
law ultimately selected on the basis of  the habitual residence of  the characteristic performer. 
118 See also De Miguel Asensio, supra n 33, 205.
119 Magnus, supra n 8, 27.
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may be considered as unfair to the other party. On the other hand, the major 
advantage is that it has entrenched the principles of  legal certainty, predictabil-
ity, foreseeability and uniformity in addressing what law applies to the contract 
of  the parties in the absence of  choice. The problem of  uncertainty in the 
Rome Convention has been corrected in Rome I. If  the parties want to avoid 
the rigidity of  Article 4 of  Rome I, they must make an express choice of  law 
under Article 3 of  Rome I.120 Indeed, the approach of  the European legisla-
tors in choosing certainty over fl exibility in Rome I should be applauded. This 
is because in most commercial transactions parties to the contract have ample 
opportunity to make an express choice of  law to govern their contract.
D. THE ESCAPE CLAUSE IN THE ROME II REGULATION
Article 14 of  Rome II grants parties the right to make an agreement on the law 
that governs their non-contractual relationship before or after the tort occurs. 
This is a right that is hardly ever exercised because in the ordinary course of  
events parties do not prepare agreements to govern their non-contractual rela-
tionship.121 In the same vein, whenever a tort occurs, the likelihood of  parties 
agreeing on a law that will govern their relationship is rare because the tortfea-
sor will be interested in a law that limits his liability and the compensation he 
should pay as opposed to the interest of  the victim.122
Thus, Article 4 of  Rome II supplements the provision of  Article 14 in the 
event the parties fail to make a choice of  law to govern their non-contractual 
obligation. Article 4(1) provides as a general rule that the law that applies to a 
tort/delict is the law of  the place where the damage occurs, irrespective of  the 
place that gives rise to the damage and where the indirect consequences of  the 
event occur.123 Article 4(2) provides (as an exception) that where the parties are 
habitually resident in the same country at the time the tort occurs, the law of  
their common habitual residence will be the applicable law.124 Article 4(3) (as 
an escape clause) provides that where “it is clear from all the circumstances of  
the case that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with a country 
other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of  that other country 
shall apply”. It also provides that a “manifestly closer connection with another 
country might be based in particular on a pre-existing relationship between 
120 Magnus ibid, 30; Hein, supra n 44, 484.
121 T Kadner Graziano, “Freedom to Choose the Applicable Law in Tort—Articles 14 and 4(3) 
of  the Rome II Regulation” in Ahern and Binchy, supra 6, 113–14.
122 Ibid.
123 See also recitals 17 & 18.
124 See also recital 18.
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the parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected with the tort/delict in 
question”.125
The escape clause in Rome II honours the claim that the law of  the place 
of  injury and place of  common habitual residence in Article 4(1) and (2) are 
not exhaustive solutions to the law applicable to non-contractual obligations.126 
The wording of  the escape clause in Article 4(3) is intended to produce some 
degree of  fl exibility in Rome II.127 However, the use of  the phrases “clear from 
all the circumstances of  the case” and “manifestly closer connection” indicate 
that it is to operate in an exceptional manner.128 The rationale provided by 
the Commission for the approach to making the escape clause exceptional in 
Rome II stems from the abuse of  the escape clause in the Rome Convention 
by courts of  Member States.129 Thus, the escape clause is tightly worded in 
such a way as to enhance legal certainty, uniformity and predictability, and to 
prevent forum shopping.130
Recital 14 to Rome II states that the escape clause should be utilised in 
such a way as to meet the “requirements of  legal certainty and the need to 
do justice in individual cases”. There has been a great deal of  debate as to 
whether the escape clause in Article 4(3) honours that claim. This section seeks 
to address the possibility of  a useful and fl exible escape in Article 4(3) clause 
that also meets the requirement of  legal certainty.
1. Relevant Connecting Factors in Article 4(3)
The escape clause in Rome II does not provide an exhaustive list of  the rel-
evant connecting factors that can be utilised to displace Article 4(1) or (2) but 
does mention “a pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a con-
tract”. It is suggested here that factors such as the residence of  the parties, 
common nationality, family relationship, events relating to the tort and a juris-
diction clause may also be relevant connecting factors that can make the escape 
clause operate.131 These factors are objective and external connecting factors.
125 Other escapes are provided in Arts 5(2), 10(4), 11(4) and 12(2)(c) of  Rome II. The escape 
clause under Rome II focuses on whether the country has a manifestly closer connection and 
not whether the right to compensation from the tort has a manifestly closer connection: Jacob 
v MIB [2010] EHWC 231 (QB) [33], [40] and [41]. Although the Court of  Appeal [2010] 
EWCA Civ 1208 [38]–[39] overturned the lower court’s decision on other grounds relating to 
the applicability of  Rome II, it did not consider the issues relating to the construction of  Art 
4. In this regard, reference to the lower Court’s decision on Art 4 remains useful judicial dicta 
[46].
126 Explanatory Memorandum, supra n 111, 12.
127 See also recital 14.
128 See also recital 18.
129 Explanatory Memorandum, supra n 111, 12. 
130 Recitals 6, 14, 15, 16 and 31; Bacon, supra n 5, [38]; Jacob, supra n 125, [23]–[24].
131  Fentiman, supra n 47, 608-609; Cheshire, North and Fawcett, supra n 6, 800–03; A Dickinson, 
The Rome II Regulation: The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Oxford University Press, 
2008), 341.
Vol. 8 No. 3 Journal of  Private International Law 537
There exists a debate as to whether other factors such as “parties’ legiti-
mate expectations”132 or “a consequence based approach”133 can be utilised in 
making the escape clause operate. The proponents in favour of  this school of  
thought argue that these connecting factors should have legitimacy in deploying 
the escape clause in Rome II because these factors have a similar foundation 
with a “pre-existing relationship” and “common habitual residence”, which are 
expressly identifi ed as exceptions to the main rule in Article 4 of  Rome II.134 
If  this view is favoured, the escape clause will have much inbuilt fl exibility and 
ability to do justice in individual cases.
The proponents of  the opposing school of  thought argue that having regard 
to the history of  Rome II in which similar connecting factors were suggested 
by the European Parliament135 but were rejected, deployment of  the escape 
clause should have no legitimacy in Rome II.136 Thus, the deployment of  the 
escape clause should be restricted to external and objective connecting factors 
only.137 If  this view is favoured, the escape clause will be more certain and pro-
duce more uniformity among courts of  Member States. This view is preferred 
on the ground that utilising subjective factors in deploying the escape clause 
is likely to lead to so much uncertainty, and forum shopping, which Rome II 
principally intends to avoid.
2. Pre-existing Relationship
One of  the connecting factors expressly identifi ed in Article 4(3) that makes the 
escape clause operate is “a pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as 
a contract”. This approach has been justifi ed as it “respects the parties’ legiti-
mate expectations and meets the need for sound administration of  justice”.138 
It has also been applauded for its practicality and simplicity.139 The following 
observations are thus made about “pre-existing relationship” as an important 
connecting factor.
First, it is not certain whether Article 4(3) is concerned with the law of  a 
country where the pre-existing relationship is based or the law governing a pre-
132  Fentiman, supra n 47, 610.
133  RJ Weintraub, “Rome II: Will it Prevent Forum Shopping and Take Account of  the Conse-
quences of  Choice of  Law?” in Ahern and Binchy, supra n 6, 47, 54–55.
134  Ibid.
135 European Parliament Legislative Resolutions on the Proposal for a Regulation of  the European 
Parliament and of  the Council on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome 
II) (COM(2003) 0427/C5-0338/203-2003/1068 (COD) (Co decision procedure fi rst reading) 
Article 4 (3).
136  D Wallis, “Rome II – A Parliamentary Tale”, in Ahern and Binchy, supra n 6, 1, 2; Dickin-
son, supra n 131, 336, 340–41.
137  Ibid. See also Mills, supra n 100, 144 –45.
138 Explanatory Memorandum, supra n 111, 11–12.
139 Symeonides, supra n 1, 204. 
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existing relationship such as a contract.140 It is submitted here that it is open to 
both interpretations as there is no provision in Rome II that prevents the court 
from taking such a stance. Furthermore, it is not all pre-existing relationships 
that will be governed by an express or implied choice of  law governing a con-
tract. Pre-existing relationships can be determined and utilised as a connecting 
factor by an applicable law of  contract in the absence of  choice.141
Secondly, the use of  the word “might” in Article 4(3) indicates that “pre-
existing relationship” as a connecting factor does not automatically determine 
if  the country is manifestly more closely connected with a tort. Thirdly, 
“pre-existing relationship” as a connecting factor could prove to be decisive 
where the law governing the contractual relationship applies to all the parties 
involved. Thus, in the Irish case of  Allied Irish Bank Plc and others v Diamond and 
Others142 there were different contractual and non-contractual relationships and 
causes of  action (involving multiple parties) before the court. The court in a 
bid to consolidate proceedings utilised Irish law under Article 4(3) because it 
governed all the employment relationships between the parties in the case.143 
However, where the contractual relationships between all the parties are capa-
ble of  severance, and may result in splitting of  the applicable law in favour of  
different countries, a “pre-existing relationship” may not be decisive in deploy-
ing the escape clause. Thus, the English case of  Alfa Laval Tumba AB & Alfa 
Laval Krakow v Separator Spares International Ltd144 concerned breach of  confi den-
tial information carried by the Polish and English parties (both in Poland and 
England) against an English company. The Polish parties had their employment 
relationship governed by Polish law, but the English parties did not have their 
relationship governed by Polish law. The High Court rightly did not utilise 
the pre-existing employment relationship between the Polish parties in hold-
140 Ibid, 203; Dickinson, supra n 131, 343–44.
141 In Hillside, supra n 5, [40], [41], [46] the case concerned a concerned a claim for damages as 
to the fi nancial loss suffered by the claimant during betting. The English High Court held that 
no choice of  law had been made to govern their betting regulations and contract. However, 
the Court in deploying the escape clause under the Rome Convention held that the law that 
was more closely connected to their contractual relationship was English law. The Court also 
utilised this pre-existing contractual relationship held to be governed by English law as one of  
the signifi cant connecting factors in holding that English law was manifestly more closely con-
nected with the non-contractual obligations between the parties under Rome II. See also Sapporo 
Breweries Ltd v Lupofresh Ltd [2012] EWHC 2013 (QB) [41]–[46], where the Court took the same 
approach in deploying the escape clause under the Private International Law (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1995 (“PIL Act”).
142 Allied Irish Bank Plc and others v Diamond and Others [2011] IEHC 505 [4.19]–[4.20]. 
143 See also Hillside, supra n 5, [46] where English law, which was held to be the proper law of  the 
contract between the claimant and defendant, was utilised as one of  the signifi cant connecting 
factors to govern their non-contractual obligation; and Sapporo Breweries Ltd, supra n 141, [41]–
[46] where the High Court took the same approach in deploying the escape clause under the 
PIL Act.
144 Alfa Laval Tumba AB & Alfa Laval Krakow v Separator Spares International Ltd [2012] EWHC 1155 
[21]–[24].
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ing Polish law as the law that was manifestly more closely connected with the 
breach of  confi dential information carried out by the English and Polish par-
ties.145
If  the above proposition is the correct position of  the law, then it is respect-
fully submitted that the High Court’s decision in Innovia Films146 should be 
reached on different grounds if  the events giving rise to the damage (such 
as the contractual pre-existing relationship between the parties) had occurred 
after 11 January 2009. The case concerned breach of  confi dence regarding 
a patent. The claimant and defendant had both signed a Confi dentiality and 
Non-Disclosure Agreement for Mutual Disclosure of  Information (“NDA con-
tract”) governed by the law of  Delaware. There was a contest as to whether 
English, Delaware or Texas law applied to govern the non-contractual obli-
gation of  breach of  confi dence. The High Court applied English law147 and 
refused to apply the law of  Delaware148 as the law that was manifestly more 
closely connected with the breach of  confi dence.
The High Court should apply Delaware law as a decisive factor based on 
the pre-existing NDA contractual relationship between both parties, which was 
governed by Delaware law. The connecting factors between English and Dela-
ware law competed as the events giving rise to the damage and the resulting 
damage were felt in both countries.149 The submission by Arnold J that the 
claimant did not allege any breach of  the NDA; or that the facts relied in sup-
port of  its claim for breach of  confi dence go beyond the NDA contract as the 
reason for refusing to apply Delaware would appear to be unduly technical and 
a very narrow interpretation of  pre-existing relationship as a connecting factor 
under Article 4(3).
(a) Accessory Connection with a Contract and Protection of  Weaker Parties.
Article 4(3) expressly allows the applicability of  a law that governs a contractual 
relationship to govern a non-contractual relationship. It is not certain whether 
145 The court refused to split the applicable law in favour of  the Polish parties. If  the High Court 
had done so, Polish law would have been manifestly closely connected to the tort based on the 
pre-existing employment relationship between the Polish parties. See also the Irish High Court 
case of  Spv Sam Dragon Inc v GE Transportation Finance (Ireland) Ltd [2012] IEHC [16]–[18].
146 Innovia Films, supra n 5, [105]–[111]. The Court utilised the common law with regard to the 
events prior to 11 January 2009 (through the application of  the PIL Act) and Rome II with 
regard to events occurring after 11 January 2009. It is not clear if  the judge would have 
reached the same decision if  the events giving rise to the damage such as the pre-existing rela-
tionship of  the parties had occurred after 11 January 2009.
147 The High Court placed reliance on the following connecting factors: (a) the defendant was an 
English company acting through its employees that devised the confi dential information; (b) the 
defendant did so in England because its employees were located in England; (c) the defendant 
disclosed the information partly in England and in Texas.
148 Innovia Films, supra n 5, [105].
149 In fact the judge regarded the resulting damage of  unjust enrichment that occurred from the 
breach of  confi dence as worldwide since it affected many countries.
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Article 4(3) in applying the law of  a contract governing a pre-existing relation-
ship to a non-contractual obligation should subject it to the protection of  the 
weaker party150 by deploying mandatory rules of  the habitual residence of  that 
party. In other words, can Article 4(3) deprive a weaker party of  protection, 
if  the accessory contract of  the parties is smuggled through the back door to 
govern their non-contractual obligations?151 There are two principal opposing 
schools of  thought in this area. The fi rst school of  thought argues that Article 
4(3), which brings party autonomy through the back door, should be jointly 
read with the explanatory memorandum152 and Article 14(2) of  Rome II that 
provides that weaker parties should not be deprived of  protection.153 Secondly, 
since the escape clause is an exceptional remedy, the court enjoys a degree of  
discretion to ensure that the escape clause is deployed in such a way as not to 
deprive the weaker party of  protection.154 The second school of  thought admits 
that although the explanatory memorandum and Article 14(2) of  Rome II pro-
vide that a weaker party should not be deprived of  protection, there is nothing 
in Article 4(3) that expressly deprives the court of  the power to apply a law 
that does not protect a weaker party under the contract.155
It is the view here that the fi rst school of  thought is preferred as it produces 
more just results and at the same time does not threaten legal certainty and 
uniformity since the escape clause is being deployed in an exceptional and dis-
cretionary manner. It will make nonsense of  Rome II and threaten its synergy 
and uniformity with Rome I if  a law that does not protect the interests of  a 
weaker party under a contract is used to govern a non-contractual obligation 
in the guise of  deploying an escape clause.156
150 Such as an employee, consumer or an insured party.
151 ThM De Boer, “Party Autonomy and its Limitations in the Rome II Regulation” (2007) 9 
Yearbook of  Private International Law 19, 27–28; Kadnar, supra n 121, 125–27; A Rushworth and 
A Scott, “Rome II: Choice of  Law for Non-contractual Obligations” [2008] Lloyd’s Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 274, 280–81, 303–05.
152 Explanatory Memorandum, supra n 111, 12–13.
153 Kadner Graziano, supra n 121, 127–29. 
154 Ibid. This appears to have been the approach favoured by the English High Court in Hillside, 
supra n 5, [42], [43] and [46]. The High Court in utilising English law as the law govern-
ing the pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties and one of  the connecting 
factors in deploying the escape clause under Art 4(3) of  Rome II, also considered if  the law 
protected the claimant (consumer) as a weaker party. Cf Sapporo Breweries Ltd, supra n 133, [41]–
[46, [55], where the High Court appears to have taken a different approach in deploying the 
escape clause under the PIL Act. The High Court held that Japanese law applied to the non-
contractual relationship between the parties based on the pre-existing relationship governed by 
Japanese law. The High Court did not refrain from applying Japanese law where it did not 
protect the party that alleged economic duress. 
155 Cheshire, North and Fawcett, supra n 6, 802–03; Dickinson, supra n 131, 345–47. Moreover, it 
is reasoned that the Explanatory Memorandum, supra n 111, 13 states that it applies to void 
or annulled contracts and pre-contractual relationships such as annulled contracts and family 
relationships.
156 Recital 7 to Rome I.
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It has been suggested that in order to create certainty parties should make 
it clear that the law that governs their contract should also govern any non-
contractual relationship arising from the contractual relationship and make it 
clear that it protects weaker parties.157 In future amendments of  Rome II, it 
should be expressly provided that utilising a pre-existing relationship as a con-
necting factor in deploying the escape clause should not deprive a weaker party 
of  protection it would have been entitled to under the law applicable by virtue 
of  Article 4(1) or (2).
3. The Relationship between Article 4(3), (2) and (1) in 
Rome II158
There appears to be another contest between certainty and fl exibility in deter-
mining the extent to which Article 4(3) can displace the applicability of  Article 
4(2) and (1).
The fi rst issue is whether the applicable law of  the country needs to have a 
weak connection to the tort in order to make the escape clause operational.159 
The fi rst view is that the escape clause should only be used as an exceptional 
remedy in order to achieve the aims of  legal certainty, predictability and uni-
formity. It is advocated that utilising the escape clause where the main rule 
does not have a weak connection to the tort will defeat these aims. The oppos-
ing view is that from a literal reading of  Article 4(3), the escape clause can 
legitimately be deployed where the law of  a country has a “manifestly closer 
relationship” with another country “other than that indicated in paragraphs 
1 or 2” even where the main rule has signifi cance.160 The latter view is pre-
ferred as it also honours the requirement of  achieving a balance between legal 
certainty and fl exibility in recital 14. A contrary interpretation will unduly cir-
cumscribe the operation of  the escape clause and make it too rigid.
The second issue is whether Article 4(3) can utilise the excluded connecting 
factors in the “place giving rise to the damage” and the “place where the indi-
rect consequences of  the event occur” in Article 4(1) to make the escape clause 
operable. The fi rst view is that adopting such a stance will subvert the main 
rule in Article 4(1).161 Furthermore, Article 17 also indicates that it is only as a 
matter of  evidence that the “place of  conduct” may be taken into account for 
the purpose of  accessing the conduct of  the tortfeasor.162
157 Beaumont and McEleavy, supra n 68, 626.
158 See also Fentiman, supra n 6, 89–91. 
159 Ibid, 103–04; Fentiman, supra n 47, 610.
160 Dickinson, supra n 131, 343; Symeonides, supra n 1, 198; Beaumont and McEleavy, supra n 68, 
647. 
161 This appears to have been the approach taken in the Irish case of  SPV Sam, supra n 145, [18] 
in excluding indirect consequences as a connecting factor while deploying the escape clause. 
See also Fentiman, supra n 6, 99–100; Fentiman, supra n 47, 608–09. 
162 Symeonides, supra n 1, 213.
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The opposing view is that Article 4(3) can utilise connecting factors excluded 
in Article 4(1) such as the “place giving rise to the damage” and “place where 
the indirect consequences of  the event occur” to make the escape clause oper-
able. The thrust of  the argument lies on the ground that the escape clause 
makes the general rule inapplicable where the tort is manifestly more closely 
connected with another country.163 The latter view is preferred because if  such 
factors are excluded, the escape clause will be unduly circumscribed and ren-
dered redundant to do justice in individual cases.164
The third issue is whether Article 4(3) can mediate between Articles 4(2) 
and (1) in such a manner that the escape clause is used to trump Article 4(2) 
in favour of  Article 4(1).165 In other words, must Article 4(3) only be utilised 
in favour of  the law of  a third country that is not the place of  damage or 
common habitual residence?166 The fi rst view is that Article 4(2) is an exception 
and infl exible rule to Article 4(1) and does not require any form of  displace-
ment in favour of  Article 4(1). To do so will threaten legal certainty and 
predictability.167
The opposing view envisages the possibility of  Article 4(3) making Article 
4(1) applicable by displacing Article 4(2).168 But this is likely to occur where 
the place of  damage competes and coincides with the common habitual resi-
dence. Furthermore, there must be other strong connecting factors in the place 
of  damage (like pre-existing relationship) that makes the application of  Article 
4(1) manifestly closer to the tort than Article 4(2).169 This view is preferable as 
163 Burton J’s judicial dicta in Alliance Bank, supra n 5, [38]. This appears to be the general judi-
cial approach especially with regard to utilising events that give rise to the damage: Jacob, supra 
n 125, [39]–[42]; Hillside, supra n 5, [40]–[46]; Alfa Laval, supra n 144, [21]–[ 24]; ICDL GCC 
Foundation, supra n 101. See also Dickinson, supra n 131, 341; Dicey, Morris and Collins, supra 
n 7, 196.
164 It may even render the escape clause useless. For example, in a tort of  unlawful misrepresen-
tation (or negligent misstatement); the event giving rise to the tort is the making the unlawful 
misrepresentation in country A, and the indirect consequences of  the reliance on the unlawful 
misrepresentation is the damage suffered by person(s) who were not parties to the contractual 
relationship in countries B, C and D. If  the event giving rise to this tort and the indirect con-
sequences are excluded, identifying the country that is manifestly more closely connected to the 
tort may prove useless. See also the case of  VTB, supra n 5, [151]–[162]. 
165 Art 4(3) is likely to operate more as an exception to Art 4(1) than 4(2) due to the infl exibility 
of  Art 4(2).
166 See also Dicey, Morris and Collins, supra n 7, 196–97; Fentiman, supra n 6, 89; Fentiman, supra 
n 47, 607–08.
167 Fentiman, supra n 6, 89; Fentiman, supra n 47, 607–08 See generally L Heffernan, “Rome II 
and Implications for Irish Tort Litigation”, in Ahern and Binchy, supra n 6, 257, 270.
168 Dickinson, supra n 131, 343; Hein, supra n 44, 483; P Stone, “The Rome II Regulation on 
Choice of  Law in Tort” (2007) Ankara Law Review 95, 104, 115.
169 It is also submitted that where there is no coincidence or competition between Articles 4(2) 
and 4(1), Article 4 (3) should not be utilised, if  not the very essence of  its playing the role as 
an escape to Article 4 (2) and achieving the primary aim of  legal certainty will be defeated. 
For example A and B are habitually resident in England. B is the agent of  A. B carries out 
business on behalf  of  A in Spain and their relationship is governed by Spanish law. B unlaw-
fully misrepresents A in Spain and makes private profi t that is not rendered to A. A sues B for 
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it honours the requirement of  achieving a balance between legal certainty and 
fl exibility as envisaged in recital 14. In other words, it makes the escape clause 
in Article 4(3) operate in a fl exible manner without threatening the require-
ment of  legal certainty.
In addition, it is also envisaged that the escape clause will come into oper-
ation in a manner that does not displace Article 4(1) or 4(2). For example, 
the escape clause may be an attractive and neat solution where the place of  
damage proves diffi cult to identify or occurs in different places as in the case 
of  violation of  an intellectual property.170
4. Dépeçage
Rome II does not expressly provide a role for dépeçage, but there remains a debate as 
to whether it is to be preserved at the discretion of  the court in certain circumstances. The 
Irish High Court, per Clarke J in ICDL GCC Foundation,171 held that, “in the light 
of  the wording of  article 4 and in the absence of  any jurisprudence from the 
ECJ to the contrary”, dépeçage “is not now available to the courts”. However, 
there are academics who have stated that the idea that dépeçage is excluded under 
Rome II is by no means free from doubt.172
The Irish Court’s approach in ICDL GCC Foundation is preferred here and 
appears to be more supportable. Article 4(3) talks of  the law of  a country 
applying to the whole tort and not issues arising out of  the tort. Furthermore, 
it will be an illegitimate exercise to utilise dépeçage that has no express place in 
Article 4(3) of  Rome II. This view is also supported by the CJEU’s approach 
in Intercontainer, which discourages the use of  dépeçage even where it is expressly 
provided for in an instrument.
It has been argued vehemently that the failure to utilise dépeçage in Article 
4(3) Rome II marks its greatest fl aw, because it makes the escape clause too 
rigid and of  no utility to do justice in individual cases.173
unlawful misrepresentation and unjust enrichment. In this case, although, Article 4(2) should 
apply to A and B in respect of  the tort of  unlawful misrepresentation and unjust enrichment, 
since they are habitually resident in England; Article 4(3) could be utilised in favour of  Spain as 
the place of  damage and the law governing their pre-existing contractual relationship in Spain 
in displacing Article 4(2) in favour of  Article 4 (1).
 
170 Hillside, supra n 5, [46]; Innovia Films, supra n 5, [107]–[111]; Alfa Laval, supra n 144, [21]–[24]; 
ICDL GCC Foundation, supra n 101, [9.5]–[9.8]. It has been argued alternatively that such a 
law should be applied on a distributive basis i.e the law of  each country where the damage 
occurred applying to the tort. See also Hillside, supra n 5, [37].
171 ICDL GCC Foundation, supra 101, [9.7]; see also Dickinson, supra n 131, 334–35, 342 and Beau-
mont and  McEleavy, supra n 68, 650.
172 Plender and Wilderspin, supra n 16, 538; Mills, supra n 100, 133, 134, 135, 148–150.
173 Symeonides, supra n 1, 200–201; see also EX Kramer, “The Rome II Regulation on the Law 
Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations: The European Private International Law Tradition 
Continued” (2008) 4 Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht 414, 422–23; Mills, supra n 100, 144–45.
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There are writers and judges who disagree with this viewpoint. First, it is 
advocated that the failure to utilise dépeçage meets the requirement of  legal certainty and 
fl exibility.174 Secondly, assuming dépeçage makes the escape clause more fl exible, it 
will complicate the confl icts system in Rome II and lead to some incongruous 
solution in assessing liability and compensation.175 Thus, in Alfa Laval176 Arnold 
J viewed the suggestion of  splitting the applicable law in favour of  both the 
Polish parties and English parties, by applying English law and Polish law with 
respect to the alleged unlawful conduct of  breach of  confi dential information 
as “lacking in common sense” and an “unattractive solution”. Indeed, the fail-
ure to utilise dépeçage in Rome II makes the system more coherent and simple 
to apply in practice. Furthermore, it reduces the risk of  the problems of  uncer-
tainty and situations where courts of  Member States tailor the escape clause to 
favour the law of  their forum for purposes of  compensation.
E. CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed the operation of  the escape clause in the Rome Con-
vention, Rome I and Rome II with the underlying tension and dilemma of  
meeting the requirements of  legal certainty and fl exibility in individual cases.
On the Rome Convention, four approaches were identifi ed as to the manner 
in which the escape clause should be interpreted. The intermediary approach 
which is favoured by the CJEU in Intercontainer is applauded here because it 
reconciles the requirement of  legal certainty and fl exibility. The Intercontainer 
decision is a guide for courts of  Member States. The discretion of  those courts 
should not be fettered by precedent in determining what connecting factors 
are signifi cant while deploying the escape clause. The court should look to the 
nature of  the contractual claim in order to weigh its signifi cance as a connect-
ing factor in individual cases.
The CJEU will have to clarify the uncertainty created in English courts with 
regard to potential factors for determining an implied choice of  law and their 
relevance while determining whether or not to deploy the escape clause.
On Rome I, it was submitted that the escape clause can only function in a 
manner similar to the strong presumption approach in the Rome Convention. 
It is admitted that the requirements of  fl exibility in deploying the escape clause 
may rarely be met. The stance taken by the European legislators is applauded 
here because it enhances legal certainty and predictability and makes an express 
174 ICDL GCC Foundation, supra n 101, [9.8].
175 Dickinson, supra n 131, 334–35; PJ Kozyris, “Rome II: Tort Confl icts on the Right Track! A 
Postcript to Symeon Symeonides’ ‘Missed Opportunity’” (2008) 56 American Journal of  Compara-
tive Law 471, 477. 
176 Alfa Laval, supra n 144, [23].
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choice of  law for the parties to a contract an attractive solution. However, since 
the doctrine of  implied choice of  law still appears in the text of  Rome I, it is 
proposed that it should be deleted from the revised version, with the factors 
that determine an implied choice of  law only to be utilised where they are rel-
evant factors in deploying the escape clause.
On Rome II, it was submitted that the escape clause is drafted in a manner 
that suggests it is to be deployed exceptionally; the escape clause in Rome II 
operates in an intermediate way. A pre-existing relationship is singled out as 
a very important factor and it is submitted here that it should be a decisive 
factor where it governs the contractual relationship of  all the parties in the 
case. However, the court should not deploy the escape clause where the law 
governing the pre-existing relationship does not protect the weaker party under 
the contract. The revised provisions of  Rome II should take account of  this 
suggestion.
Furthermore, the debate as to whether dépeçage has a role to play in deploy-
ing the escape clause in Rome I and Rome II has recently come to the fore. It 
is considered that it has no role to play.
It is anticipated that some of  the issues discussed here, especially regarding 
the deployment of  the escape clause in Rome I and Rome II, will eventu-
ally come before the CJEU to lay some of  the existing academic and judicial 
debates to rest.
